Criminal Law: The Grand Jury in Wisconsin by Coffey, William M. & Richards, Alan E.
Marquette Law Review
Volume 58
Issue 3 1975 (Number 3) Article 3
Criminal Law: The Grand Jury in Wisconsin
William M. Coffey
Alan E. Richards
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
William M. Coffey and Alan E. Richards, Criminal Law: The Grand Jury in Wisconsin, 58 Marq. L. Rev. 517 (1975).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol58/iss3/3
THE GRAND JURY IN WISCONSIN
WILLIAM M. COFFEY* and ALAN E. RICHARDS**
The grand jury as an institution of Anglo-Saxon law has re-
ceived extensive critical treatment.' While perhaps lacking in em-
pirical foundation,2 arguments both in support of and in opposition
to the continuance of the system abound. Despite the exhaustive
debate with over 800 years of operational experience from which
to draw conclusions,3 the issue of grand jury viability as reflected
nationally remains unresolved. In more than half of the states, no
person may be charged with the commission of a felony except by
indictment returned by a legally constituted grand jury.4 In most
other states, the prosecutor has discretion either to seek a grand
jury indictment or to commence a felony prosecution directly by
filing an information.' Thus, although never made applicable to the
states by the Fourteenth Amendment,' and although prone to argu-
ments in its support which stress what the system is supposed to
be rather than what it has become, the state grand jury system
persists. The purpose of this article is to review the general criti-
cism of the grand jury, to discuss its application to the grand jury
in Wisconsin and to examine, without the context of the fundamen-
tal criticism, the operation of the Wisconsin system.
CRITICISM IN GENERAL
In analyzing any argument of grand jury utility, perhaps a
critical consideration that should be examined against every propo-
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sition offered is which of three possible perspectives the assertion
most benefits: that of the district attorney-law enforcement agency,
the prospective defendant(s), and/or the public-at-large. This dis-
tinction warrants close scrutiny, for a comparison of the arguments
offered by proponents and opponents of the grand jury often re-
veals exact opposite allegations, each ostensibly supported by
"fact." The absence of recent empirical data precludes absolute
identification of the "correct" allegation. To identify the interest
benefited by a particular viewpoint would, very often, provide
some basis for preferring one side to another. In addition, an
awareness of which of the traditional functions of the grand jury
is being considered should aid in drawing conclusions about
whether the entire system, a part of it, or none of it should be
abandoned or amended. This identification, coupled with an obser-
vation expressed in a recent, unpublished study conducted by the
National Conference of Metropolitan Courts that the decisive fac-
tor in preferring one method of prosecution to another was the
respondent's familiarity with a particular system probably supplies
the most accurate scale for weighing the respective arguments.7
Historically, the grand jury has had three basic functions: (1)
investigating any public offenses that may have been committed
within the community; (2) determining who is responsible for an
offense and deciding whether there is probable cause to charge him
with the commission of a crime; and (3) making its findings public
in an appropriate tribunal by submitting an indictment, present-
ment, or report.' Some commentators have divided the grand
jury's functions into two general categories, investigatory and ac-
cusatory The distinction is one of degree not easily recognized,
the investigatory often ripening into the accusatory.
Supporters of the grand jury find it a suitable system for fulfill-
ing these functions based upon the premise that "the institution of
the grand jury is the bulwark of protection for the innocent and
the sword of the community against wrongdoers."'" As the United
States Supreme Court in Wood v. Georgia" stated:
7. Report on the Grand Jury Indictment Process, National Conference of Metropolitan
Courts 33 (1974) (unpublished).
8. Brice, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue
Influence, 39 Cni. L. REv. 763 (1971-1972).
9. Orfield, The Federal Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 343, 394 (1958).
10. Wickersham, The Grand Jury, 38 NEw YORK STATE B.J. 427 (1966).
11. 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
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: . . [T]his body has been regarded as a primary security to the
innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppresive prosecution; it
serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between
the accusor and the accused, whether the latter be an individual,
minority group, or other, to determine whether a charge is
founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating power
or by malice and personal ill will."
This basic premise, however, appears to be constructed upon
dubious historical incident and to be reinforced by equally ques-
tionable contemporary experience.
The historical precedent to which grand jury proponents inevit-
ably refer when tracing its protective function occured in 1681.
The true independence of the grand jury, made possible by
the institution of secrecy, was realized in 1681 in the Trial of
Stephen Colledge (1681), and the Earl of Shaftesbury's Trial
(1681). Each of these men was accused by the Crown of high
treason. At the insistence of the King's counsel, the grand juries
were required to hear the witness in open court. After doing so,
the jury in each case demanded and was granted the opportunity
to examine the witnesses again in private and to deliberate in
private. In each case the jury then refused to indict. These two
cases are celebrated as establishing the grand jury as a bulwark
against the oppression and despotism of the Crown. 3
Had these cases actually established what they are purported to
have established, they would indeed have marked a change in what
the grand jury was originally created to accomplish and who it was
to serve. However, a closer examination of the circumstances sur-
rounding the trials of Stephen Colledge and the Earl of Shaftes-
bury and subsequent incidents of political prosecution reveals that,
if a premise is to be established which is to be reflective of what
actually has occured, it must necessarily be different than the one
that its proponents offer.
The Assize of Claredon in 1166 first established the criminal
grand jury, a body of twelve knights, or other freemen whose
function was to accuse those who, according to public knowledge,
had committed crimes. The purpose was to supply the central
government the benefit of local knowledge in the apprehension of
those who violated the king's peace. 4 As one commentary analo-
12. Id. at 390.
13. In The Matter of Russo, 53 F.R.D. 564, 569 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
14. Alexander & Portman, Grand Jury Indictment Versus Prosecution by Informa-
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gized, "the creation of the grand jury was the parallel in the field
of criminal justice to the Domesday Book . . . . [t]he grand jury
brought the royal presence into the lucrative field of the criminal
law, where fines and forfeitures would provide new additions to the
royal treasury."1 5 From this initial role the grand jury is said to
have evolved into a protectorate of the accused.
In an article aptly entitled Demythologizing The Historic Role
of the Grand Jury," the functioning of the grand jury during peri-
ods of political stress was examined. The conclusion reached is that
the history of the grand jury "evidences the vulnerability of that
institution to pressure, abuse and manipulation by determined par-
tisans. ' 17 In support of its conclusion, the article discusses, among
others, the cases of Colledge and Shaftesbury. As it happened, a
second grand jury was convened in another county populated with
more pliable citizens. In August of the same year in which he had
initially been "acquitted," Colledge was executed. Shaftesbury, to
escape a similar fate, was forced into exile." Had this been nothing
more than an unfortunate relapse in an ultimately successful move
toward independence from political manipulation, perhaps the
popular premise could be historically sustained. However, a study
of Anglo-American history belies the theory that in past periods
of political stress, the grand jury's protective aspects were intensi-
fied. Rather, the pattern that emerges is that of the grand jury not
only failing in protection but aiding in exploitation. 9
In addition to historic vulnerability to political manipulation,
three other areas of contention relating to the grand jury as a
"bulwark of liberty" concern procedural aspects of the system: the
requirement of secrecy; the absence of defense counsel; and the
presence of the district attorney.
Concerning the existence of secrecy, the general reasons given
for the policy are:
tion-An Equal Protection-Due Process Issue, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 999 (1971).
15. Tigar & Levy, The Grand Jury as a New Inquisition, 50 MICH. STATE B.J. 695
(1971).
16. Schwartz, Demythologizing The Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AM. CRtM. L.
REv. 701 (1971-72).
17. Id. at 703.
18. Id. at 710.
19. Winograd & Fassler, The Political Question, 9 TRIAL 10 (1973); Donner & Cerruti,
The Grand Jury Network: How the Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted A Tradi-
tional Safeguard ofIndividual Rights, 214 THE NATION 5 (1972); Tigar & Levy, supra note
15, Schwartz, supra note 16.
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1. To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated;
2. To insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delib-
eration, and to prevent persons subject to indictments or their
friends from importuning the grand jurors;
3. To prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the
witnesses who may have testified before the grand jury and later
appear at the trial of those indicted by it;
4. To encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of crimes;
and
5. To protect an innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there is no probability of
guilt."0
As held by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, the secrecy of the
grand jury proceeding is for the benefit of the jurors and the public
rather than the one who is indicted. 21 For this reason, only the
grand jurors and the reporters are required by statute to take an
oath of secrecy.22 Witnesses do not take an oath of secrecy and
after their testimony is completed, may relate the substance of both
the questions put to them and their responses. The minutes or
transcript of the grand jury remains secret unless and until a judge
orders that they, in whole or part, be made public.23 The names
of those individuals on the jury list are secret and the manner in
which the grand juror votes is likewise secret.? Proponents of the
grand jury find its secrecy especially invaluable in combating or-
ganized crime, when such secrecy is combined with the power to
compel the appearance and testimoney of reluctant witnesses and
to require the production of evidence. They argue that
a compulsory process is necessary to obtain essential testimony
or material. This is most readily accomplished by an alternative
mechanism through which the attendance of witnesses and pro-
duction of books and records can be ordered.2
20. United States v. Badger Paper Mills, Inc., 243 F. Supp. 443, 445-446 (E.D. Wis.
1965), citing United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-629 (1954).
21. State v. *Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 322, 50 N.W.2d 439 (1952).
22. Wis. STAT. §§ 255.11, 255.13(2) (1973).
23. Wis. STAT. § 255.21 (1973).
24. Wis. STAT. §§ 255.10(1), 255.20 (1973).
25. Lumbard, The Criminal Justice Revolution and The Grand Jury, 39 NEw YORK
STATE B.J. 401 (1967).
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There is a real question whether those public policy reasons are
in fact valid, and whether grand jury proceedings are in fact secret.
The evidence would indicate that a grand jury proceeding is secret
in name only. The public is informed when the grand jury is called,
the location of the grand jury proceeding is generally revealed, and
the witnesses can relate their experiences before the grand jury.
What remains is the potential for abuse resulting from the attempt
to keep the grand jury proceeding secret. The Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals has examined the dangers and abuses of this vale of
secrecy. 6
It is a serious thing for any man to be indicted for an infamous
crime. Whether innocent or guilty, he cannot escape the ignon-
imy of the accusation, the dangers of perjury and the errors at
his trial, the torture of suspense and the pain of imprisonment,
and the burden of bail. The secrecy of any judicial proceeding is
a tempting invitation to the malicious, the ambitious, and the
reckless to try to use it to benefit themselves and their friends and
to punish their enemies. If malicious, ambitious or overzealous
men, either in or out of office, may with impunity persuade grand
juries without legal evidence, either by hearsay testimony, undue
influence, or worse means, to indict whom they will, and there is
no way in which the court may annul such illegal accustations,
the grand jury, instead of that protection of "the citizen against
unfounded accusation, whether it comes from government or be
prompted by partisan passion or private enmity:" which it was
primarily designed to provide, may become an engine of oppres-
sion and a mockery of justice.2
Consideration of the validity of the secrecy arguments requires
that the remaining two procedural aspects be included in any deci-
sion. The primary abuse attributable to the grand jury system is
the extent to which the grand jury can be manipulated by the
prosecutorial officer. For once inside the grand jury room, a wit-
ness, having no right to counsel,2 to confront his accusers,2 to
cross examine other witnesses 0 or to produce explanatory or re-
buttal evidence,31 is at the mercy of the prosecutor. Justice Na-
26. Schmidt v. United States, 115 F.2d 394 (1940), quoting from McKinney v. United
States, 199 F.2d 25 (1912).
27. Id. at 397.
28. Orfield, supra note 9, at 425.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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than R. Sobel of the New York Supreme Court, while noting that
the grand jury system had been abolished in twenty-eight states,
contends that "whenever it has been abolished the primary reason
assigned was that the grand jury had committed itself to become
a rubber stamp of the prosecutor. ' 32 This dependence upon the
prosecutor in performing both its investigatory and accusatory
functions is a direct consequence of the manner in which the grand
jury procures its information.
In the past, the grand jury often combed the community to un-
cover reprehensible activity, decided the scope and direction of
its investigations, and issued general statements and findings
concerning political and social questions. But grand jurors today
lack the intimate knowledge of community activity possessed by
grand jurors of preurban society. They also lack the investigative
tools now necessary to find evidence of crime. Allowing profes-
sional investigative agencies to gather relevant facts and present
them to the grand jury through the prosecutor has increased
efficiency in investigation and decision making. At the same
time, however, it has made the modem grand jury a generally
more passive instrument than its precursors. Grand juries now
conduct their investigations almost exclusively within the con-
fines of the grand jury room, rely almost entirely on the prosecu-
tor to determine the subject matter and general direction of the
investigation, and seldom issue documents unrelated to some
specific criminal activity or malfeasance in office."3
In addition to this dependence upon the prosecutor in its investiga-
tory role, its reliance is equally apparent in its consideration of
probable cause in its accusatory role.
Though free to take part in the interrogation, the grand jurors
must place enormous trust in the prosecutor's guidance. It is he,
after all, who tells them what the charge is, who selects the facts
for them to hear, who shapes the tone and feel of the entire case.
It is the prosecutor alone who has the technical training to under-
stand the legal principles upon which the prosecution rests, where
individual liberty begins and ends, the evidential value of avail-
able facts and the extent to which notice may be taken of pro-
posed evidence.
32. The Grand Jury: Protector Against the State or Prosecutor's Rubber Stamp, New
York Times, (Sept. 26, 1966) p.44. Note: When saying the grand jury had been abolished
in half the States, Mr. Sobel quite obviously meant as the exclusive method of finding
probable cause. See Spain, supra note 4.
33. Brice, supra note 8, at 764.
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In short, the only person who has a clear idea of what is
happening in the grand jury room is the public official whom
these twenty-three novices are expected to check. So that even if
a grand jury were disposed to assert its historic independence in
the interest of an invidividual's liberty, it must, paradoxically,
look to the very person whose misconduct they are supposed to
guard against for guidance as to when he is acting oppressively.34
While grand jury proponents have come forth with a limited
amount of statistical data in an attempt to refute prosecutor reli-
ance by the grand jurors, the only extensive empirical study,
consisting of an examination of 7,414 indictments, found that in
only 5.15 percent of the cases initiated by the prosecutor in which
he expressed an opinion was there a disagreement between the
opinion of the prosecutors and the grand jury dispositions.36 "The
Second Circuit recently described the grand jury as basically 'a law
enforcement agency'-a conclusion supported by numerous stud-
ies."37 Even the United States Supreme Court in the majority
opinion of United States v. Dionisio,38 acknowledged that "The
grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protective
bulwark standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an over-
zealous prosecutor. . .. -3" To this, Justice Douglas, speaking for
the minority, added: "It is, indeed, common knowledge that the
Grand Jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citi-
zen and the government, is now a tool of the executive." These
declarations of grand jury manipulation under a value of secrecy
become all the more odious when coupled with the remaining pro-
cedural aspect-refusing a witness before the grand jury the pres-
ence of his counsel.
The purpose of excluding counsel from the grand jury room
was examined in some length in People v. Ianniello:41
. ..[I]t is, of course, a familiar proposition that the lawyer for
a witness is not entitled to be present in the Grand Jury room.
. ..This rule rests up on the statutory exclusion of all except
certain authorized persons before the Grand Jury and the need
34. Antell, supra note 3, at 154.
35. Wickersham, supra note 10, at 429.
36. Morse, supra note 2, at 151.
37. Alexander & Portman, supra note 114, at 1001.
38. 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
39. Id. at 17.
40. Id. at 23.
41. 21 N.Y.2d 418, 288 N.Y.S.2d 462 (1968).
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to preserve the secrecy of Grand Jury proceedings. There re-
mains, however, the further question whether the witness should
not be entitled to leave the Grand Jury room to consult with his
lawyer. . . . Such conduct by the witness does not violate the
statutory policy of secrecy, for it has always been understood
that the witness is at all times free to discuss his testimony out-
side the Grand Jury room. Whether and to what extent the wit-
ness ought to have a right to consult with his lawyer depends
upon an analysis of the proper role of counsel in these circum-
stances, and the need to avoid procedural strictures which would
impair the effectiveness of Grand Jury investigation.
Since a Grand Jury proceeding is properly an investigation
rather than a prosecution directed against the witness, the wit-
ness has no right to be 'represented' by counsel, in the technical
sense. However, in light of current recognition of the importance
of counsel in providing effective notice of rights, it is difficult to
maintain that the witness is not entitled to the advice of his
lawyer."2
Thus, two policy reasons are advanced for excluding presence of
counsel-the need to maintain secrecy and the nonjudicial nature
of the proceedings. Neither of the two withstand the slightest anal-
ysis.
With respect to the policy of secrecy, it cannot logically be
contended that secrecy is preserved when counsel is permitted to
stand just outside the jury room, and the witness is allowed to leave
whenever legal advice is sought. Since a witness is not bound to
secrecy in the first place, what principle is compromised in allow-
ing counsel direct access to the information? Any anticipated prob-
lem of an attorney representing multiple witnesses so as to effec-
tively hear a major portion of the proceedings could be prevented
by limiting the number of clients an individual attorney may repre-
sent. Likewise, fear that presence of counsel would delay the pro-
ceedings through procedural maneuvering could be remedied by
limiting the role of attorneys to that of advisor as opposed to
advocate.
Regarding the nature of the proceedings as only investigatory
and therefore not requiring counsel is to ignore the primary func-
tion of most grand juries-returning indictments. The rationale
adopted by the United States Supreme Court in Coleman v.
42. Id. at 423-24.
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Alabama 3 concerning the right to counsel in a preliminary hear-
ing as required by the sixth amendment is just as applicable to a
grand jury proceeding. It is applicable because the "two stages of
the criminal process-the preliminary hearing and the indicting
grand jury-perform the same function. They both lead to a
determination of whether the prosecutor can establish a probable
cause case against the accused. Moreover, there is absolutely no
difference in the applicable standard of probable cause."" In
Coleman, the court declared that:
The determination whether the hearing is a 'critical stage' requir-
ing the provision of counsel depends, as noted, upon an analysis
'whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights in-
heres in the. . . confrontation and the ability of counsel to help
avoid that prejudice.' United States v. Wade, [388 U.S. 218, 227
(1967)]. Plainly the guiding hand of counsel at the preliminary
hearing is essential to protect the indigent accused against an
erroneous or improper prosecution."
As one author has commented:
The Court's opinion in Coleman must apply with equal if not
greater force to the indicting grand jury. If the accused is in need
of a lawyer to argue the probable cause issue before a judicial
officer, the presence of counsel is even more indispensible when
a body of laymen is called upon to apply this legal standard.
Moreover, the same need exists before a grand jury as at the
preliminary hearing for a defense lawyer to freeze the testimony
of prosecution witnessessses for the purpose of impeachment at
trial. Furthermore, since the Supreme Court concluded in
Coleman that it is essential that the accused obtain through coun-
sel some discovery of the prosecutor's case against him in a
preliminary hearing, there is no possible rationalization for deny-
ing the accused his right to discovery at a probable cause grand
jury proceeding where the prosecutor has denied him a prelimi-
nary hearing."
The combined effect of imposed "secrecy," absence of defense
counsel and domination by the prosecutor presents anything but an
image of the grand jury as a "bulwark of protection for the inno-
43. 399 U.S. I (1970).
44. Dash, The Indicting Grand Jury: A Critical Stage? 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 808 (1971-
1972).
45. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
46. Dash, supra note 44, at 815.
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cent." Certainly any fair evaluation should conclude that the insti-
tution of the grand jury is most benevolent in its treatment of the
prosecutor. Such was the conclusion reached by the Committee of
The National Conference of Metropolitan Courts . 7 Whether it can
be said that the public is therefore also served is an attractive
argument in a time plagued by civil disobedience. Nevertheless, the
better, the required argument is that any institution that contrib-
utes to the likelihood of arbitrary or uneven enforcement of the law
needs correction. The degree and form that such correction should
take, however, must await further consideration of the remaining
arguments and requires a distinction to be made between the two
functions of the grand jury.
Criticism up to this point has largely focused upon the indicting
function of the grand jury. The distinction is important, for often
in the clamor that accompanies a demand for abolishment of the
grand jury, the functions are not independently considered. Indis-
criminate application undermines accurate evaluation. While al-
ready noted that a distinction exists more in theory than in prac-
tice, meaningful recommendation requires recognition of a stan-
dard.
In addition to the arguments involving the grand jury as the
"bulwark of protection," a number of collateral reasons for con-
tinuing or abandoning the indicting grand jury have been ad-
vanced. These arguments are collateral, because they are not cen-
tral to an analysis of the critical issue of the indicting grand
jury-whether it has successfully struck a balance among the three
interests to be served. They are properly relegated to a supportive
role. The question of the viability of the indicting grand jury must
be decided upon those considerations already discussed for therein
lies the due process considerations. The remaining arguments,
though few in number, address themselves to the investigatory
function of the grand jury. The absence of any appreciable criti-
cism of this function can probably be attributed to the fact that it
is a function little used and a function whose objectives are better
suited to the ex parte character of the proceedings.
Proponents of the grand jury report that: the public-at-large
supports the continuance of the institution;" the system allows a
47. Report on the Grand Jury Indictment Process, supra note 7, at 74.
48. Brown, Ten Reasons Why the Grand Jury in New York Should Be Retained and
Strengthened, 22 THE RECORD 476 (1967).
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means of public participation in law enforcement;49 it is a non-
political and non-partisan group capable of objective evaluation; 0
it is the citizen's best means of access in the supervision of public
officials and public agencies; 5' and that the system is economical.5 1
To this opponents reply that: "participation by the public in
prosecution without experiencing the defense function is not partic-
ularly beneficial to an understanding of law and order, which con-
templates not only the protection of society from criminal activity
but a fair system for determining criminal guilt;"'" the grand jury
lacks impartiality because it is not representative of the
community;5 unnecessary delays prejudicial to the accused occur,
denying him the constitutional right to a speedy trial;"- the leverage
of a grand jury indictment may be used to extract a guilty plea,
even though the prosecutor does not feel he can win at trial; 6 in
those states in which the prosecutor has an option to accuse by
either indictment or information the unlimited discretion to choose
is patently unfair and subject to abuse; 57 presentation before a
grand jury provides the prosecutor with an opportunity to test a
certain line of questioning, provides him with rehearsal and time
to prepare his case;-" "the prosecutor is able to obtain an indication
from the grand jury of what the reaction of a petit jury might be
to the charges;"" and that the system is expensive."'
The posture of the arguments is somewhat familiar. While
most arguments offered by its proponents are applicable to both
grand jury functions and are more public-oriented, rebuttal contin-
ues to stress the defense inequities of the indicting grand jury. Of
particular interest are two arguments advanced by the proponents
concerning the fact that the grand jury has public support and
49. Id. at 472.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 474.
52. Report on the Grand Jury Indictment Process, supra note 7, at 76.
53. Id. at 79-80.
54. Id. at 26. See also Boyarsky, Just How Grand is the Grand Jury?, 68 Los ANGELES
MAGAZINE (Ap. 71).
55. Id. at 25. See also Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. REV. 461 (1959).
56. Id. at 28. See also Calkins, Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, U.
ILL. L. FORUM 423 (1966).
57. Id. See also Note, Evaluating the Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecu-
tion: An Iowa Case Study, 57 IowA L. REV. 1354 (1972).
58. Id. at 17.
59. Id. at 18.
60. Id. at 29.
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provides political supervision. The latter probably explains the for-
mer and also provides a basis of recommendation, such recommen-
dation to be discussed in the consideration of alternatives.
In evaluating the institution of the grand jury within the context
of this criticism, a decisive factor is the availability of alternative
method for fulfilling the traditional functions of the system. To the
extent that such alternatives are better able to accomplish these
functions and maintain a balance of interests, the grand jury should
be abandoned.
Concerning its accusatory function of determining whether
probable cause exists, the use of the information proceded by the
preliminary hearing process provides a superior method. Not only
is the information-preliminary hearing quicker, cheaper and more
efficient,6 it recognizes and preserves due process requirements. At
a preliminary examination, an accused is allowed representation by
counsel. The United States Supreme Court in Coleman outlined
the importance of this right.
First, the laywer's skilled examination and cross-examination of
witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State's case, that
may lead the magistrate to refuse to bind the accused over. Sec-
ond, in any event, the skilled interrogation of witnesses by an
experienced lawyer can fashion a vital impeachment tool for use
in cross-examination of the State's witness at the trial, or pre-
serve testimony favorable to the accused of a witness who does
not appear at the trial. Third, trained counsel can more effec-
tively discover the case the State has against his client and make
possible the preparation of a proper defense to meet that case at
the trial. Fourth, counsel can also be influential at the prelimi-
nary hearing in making effective arguments for the accused on
such matters as the necessity for an early psychiatric examina-
tion or bail."2
Also, a provision rather unique to Wisconsin of equal significance
is the application of the rules of evidence to a preliminary examina-
tion. The judicial council committee's note of Chapter 91163
stated:
This subsection differs from the Proposed Federal Rules which
61. Moley, supra note 2, at 430.
62. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
63. Ch. 911 WISCONSIN RULES OF EVIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R366 (1974); See also 56
MARQ. L. REv. 443 (1973).
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exclude preliminary examinations from the application of evi-
dentiary rules. Federal criminal procedure relies heavily upon
indictment which eliminates a preliminary examination. Wiscon-
sin relies heavily upon a complaint which requires a preliminary
examination unless waived. A preliminary examination is not a
preliminary trial, State v. Knudson, 51 Wis. 2d 270, 280, 187
N.W.2d 321, 327 (1971), but does have a by-product benefit for
the accused, Whitty v. State, supra. Although the judicial deter-
mination of probable cause is comparable to other proceedings
referred to in this subsection which are excluded from the appli-
cation of the rules of evidence, the reporter for the Criminal
Rules Committee advises that in its revision of criminal proce-
dure, the Committee intended the application of the rules of
evidence to a preliminary examination. 4
The ramifications of this provision should be obvious. While the
quantum of proof remains unchanged, the quality of the proof is
raised, requiring admissible evidence before the state may file
criminal charges. Even without the application of the rules of evi-
dence to the preliminary examination, the fact that the accused is
represented by counsel who may actively participate in the deter-
mination of probable cause before a legally knowledgable magis-
trate and is entitled to a copy of the entire proceedings for use in
preparation of trial places the parties on an equal basis.
In those instances in which the district attorney has knowledge
of the commission of a crime but insufficient information concern-
ing the identities and/or circumstances of its accomplishment, the
use of the John Doe proceeding serves as a superior substitute for
the investigatory function of the grand jury. The proceeding is
before a judge only and is started by a complaint which may be
initiated by any person.6" "The extent of the investigation is a
matter which falls within the discretion of the judge and it is rebut-
tably presumed that the judge has not abused his discretion 'both
as to duration and scope of the proceedings.' "6 Features of the
John Doe proceeding include: the right to refuse answers based on
the privilege against self-incrimination; 7 compelled testimony in
exchange for immunity;" power to hold a witness in contempt for
64. Id. at 444-445.
65. Wis. STAT. § 968.26 (1973).
66. BROwN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE 14 (1971),
citing State ex rel Niedziejko v. Coffey, 22 Wis. 2d 392, 402, 126 N.W.2d 96 (1964).
67. Id.
68. Id. at 15 citing Wis. STAT. § 972.08(1) (1973).
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failure to answer questions within the scope of the granted immun-
ity;" the right to the presence of counsel (although counsel is not
allowed to examine his client, cross-examine other witnesses, or
argue before the judge);70 the availability of secrecy of the proceed-
ings which is binding on the witnesses as well as the judge, if the
nature of the investigation would thereby be better served 7 ' the
inspection of the record and transcript is limited to the district
attorney "unless it is used by the prosecution at the preliminary
hearing or the trial of the accused and then only to the extent that
it is so used; ' 72 and the requirement of a preliminary examination
if a complaint is issued based on the findings of the John Doe
proceeding.7 3 Thus, the John Doe retains those powers essential
to criminal investigation while providing adequate safeguards for
those required to participate in the proceeding. Add to this the fact
that the John Doe investigation is more economical and the com-
parison is complete.74
The only remaining problem to be considered is the desirability
of maintaining a grand jury system for the purpose of providing
public supervision of the political process. In their study of the
grand jury, the National Conference of Metropolitan Courts made
two observations relevant to this question. While concluding that
the indicting function of the grand jury "should be abolished be-
cause viable alternatives exist to ensure the fulfillment, in a more
orderly way, of the objectives for which grand juries, as accusatory
bodies, were originally created," 75 continuance of the grand jury
investigative function was advocated.
We feel that exercise of the power to investigate and hold ac-
countable governmental agencies is of extreme value to the pub-
lic, and should be expanded and encouraged, but that it should
be exercised within a procedural framework which, at the very
least, rejects the presentation of hearsay evidence. Government
is increasingly complicated and the public increasingly alienated
from its operation. In a modern setting, the use of representative
citizens to provide a check on their government may still prove
beneficial. 7
69. Id. See also Wis. STAT. § 972.08(2) (1973).
70. Id. citing Wis. STAT. § 968.26 (1973).
71. Id. at 16 citing Wis. STAT. § 968.26 (1973).
72. Id. citing Wis. STAT. § 971.23 (1973).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 17.
75. Report on the Grand Jury Indictment Process, supra note 7, at 72.
76. Id. at 80.
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The exact nature of the procedural framework within which the
grand jury serving in this capacity should work is beyond the scope
of this article. It is sufficient to recognize the desirability of main-
taining the system in this capacity and to reiterate the necessity of
providing a system which balances the rights of all the interests
involved.
THE CRITICISM AS APPLICABLE TO THE SYSTEM IN WISCONSIN
The grand jury in Wisconsin is subject to the criticisms offered
in the preceding section. It is subject to those criticisms because
the grand jury in Wisconsin has retained the identical operational
provisions found to be repugnant to due process considerations.
However, while the institution itself has remained unamended, one
significant procedural right has been enacted and another intro-
duced into the legislature which greatly diminish the abuses of the
grand jury indictment power.
In 1973, the Wisconsin legislature amended section 971.02(1)
to require, unless waived in writing or in open court, that a defen-
dant indicted for a felony by a grand jury be entitled to a prelimi-
nary examination." This provision goes a long way toward obviat-
ing many of the inequities associated with the grand jury. Since,
in Wisconsin, the rules of evidence are applicable to preliminary
hearings, 8 any indictment which is the product of a substantial
amount of inadmissible evidence will- be screened before the trial
stage. The prosecutor, knowing that any indictment must with-
stand the scrutiny of a preliminary examination before a magis-
trate and the opposition of defense counsel operating under the
rules of evidence, must become more receptive to the quality of
evidence offered to the grand jury. Likewise, the difficulties pre-
sented to the defense in attempting to procure transcripts of the
grand jury to support an allegation that illegally obtained evidence
77. WIs. STAT. § 971.02 (1973):
Preliminary examination; when prerequisite to an Information or indictment. (1)
If the defendant is charged with a felony in any complaint, including a complaint
issued under s.968.26, or when the defendant has been returned to this state for
prosecution through extradition proceedings under ch. 976, or any indictment, no
information or indictment shall be filed until the defendant hds had a preliminary
examination, unless he waives such examination. . . in writing or in open court or
unless he is a corporation. The omission of the preliminary examination shall not
invalidate any information unless the defendant moves to dismiss prior to the entry
of a plea.
78. See § 911.01 WISCONSIN RULES OF EvIDENCE, 59 Wis. 2d R366; See also 56 MARQ.
L. REV. 444-445 (1973).
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was used or other grounds of impropriety existed79 in the indict-
ment becomes less significant. The imposition of the preliminary
hearing between the indictment and the trial provides an alterna-
tive method of discovery. The suspect will also be afforded an
opportunity to discover with greater particularity the facts and
circumstances surrounding the alleged commission of the crime. 0
This advantage is not insubstantial, especially when considering
that a witness before a grand jury need not be informed of the topic
of the investigation at the time of his testimony.81 Thus, section
971.02 provides a measure of protection to one indicted by a grand
jury in that a check on the persuasive quality of the evidence is
made available. A second problem, often of equal importance to a
witness appearing before a grand jury, is the preservation of the
constitutional right against self incrimination. It was to this aspect
that Representatives Sicula and Czerwinski addressed themselves
when introducing Assembly Bill 1058 to the Wisconsin legislature,
which was referred to the judiciary committee this past session.12
79. Such as prejudicial comments made by the district attorney or the judge, erroneous
instructions prejudicial to defendant. See Brice, supra note 8.
80. See State v. Camara, 28 Wis. 2d 365, 373 N.W.2d 1 (1965).
81. Orfield, supra note 9, at 384. It should be noted however that if at the beginning of
questioning it has already been determined that the witness is a "target," He must be given
his Miranda warnings and be informed of the suspected charge. See United States v. Krebs,
349 F. Supp. 1049 (W.D. Wis. 1972).
82. An act to repeal and recreate § 968.06; and to create § 255.145, 255.147 and
972.08(3) of the statutes, relating to rights of witnesses and secrecy at grand juries.
SECTION 1. 255.145 and 255.147 of the statutes are created to read:
255.145 WITNESSES RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TRANSCRIPT. (1)
Any witness appearing before a grand jury may have counsel present, and such
counsel shall be allowed to examine his client, call and cross examine other witnesses.
(2) Any witness appearing before a grand jury shall be given a transcript of all
testimony that relates to him given the grand jury prior to his testifying.
255.147 SECRECY. (1) All motions, including but not limited to those for
immunity or a privilege, brought by a witness appearing before a grand jury shall
be made, heard and decided in complete secrecy and not in open court if the witness
bringing the motion or exercising the immunity or privilege so requests.
(2) Grand jury proceedings shall be held in complete secrecy and held in such a
manner that no media coverage of witnesses coming and going is possible.
SECTION 2. 968.06 of the statutes is repealed and recreated to read:
986.06 INDICTMENT BY GRAND JURY. Upon indictment by a grand jury
a complaint shall be issued, as provided by s. 968.02 upon the person named in the
indictment, and such person shall be entitled to a preliminary hearing under s. 970.03
and all proceedings thereafter shall be the same as if the person had been initially
charged under s. 968.02 and had not been indicted by a grand jury.
SECTION 3. 972.08(3) of the statutes is created to read: 972.08(3) Any witness
appearing before a grand jury may be ordered confined under sub. (2) for not more
1975]
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The bill would create a statute permitting any witness appearing
before the grand jury to be represented by counsel who would be
permitted to examine his client and call and cross-examine other
witnesses. The witness would also be entitled to a transcript of all
testimony relating to him given to the grand jury prior to his
testifying. The importance of the presence of counsel as related to
the preservation of a witness' rights was underlined quite descrip-
tively by one writer.
Regrettably, the common picture emerging from these inves-
tigations is one of a lone witness, thrust into the legal darkness
of the grand jury, barricaded from his lawyer, threatened by all
sorts of unseen dangers, who becomes hopelessly lost in this
desolate and bewildering legal environment. There, the witness,
often outnumbered by prosecutors who badger and bully him
with endless questions, is required to pass between Scylla and
Charybdis without any legal escort. A response to one question
means the ultimate surrender of his privilege against self-
incrimination, whereas his failure to reply means possible impris-
onment for for contempt if he has been properly granted immun-
ity.8
However melodramatic, the description does point out the com-
plexities involved in asserting the privilege and, if granted, in deter-
mining the scope of the protection when answering questions. The
presence of counsel would insure that legal ignorance would not
result in deprivation of legal rights.
If the bill authorizing presence of counsel is enacted, the practi-
cal significance of the two provisions would be a grand jury system
approximating the John Doe proceeding in its effective operation.
The primary difference would be the authority empowered to de-
termine the existence or absence of probable cause-seventeen lay-
men or a single magistrate. Since the John Doe investigation capa-
bly performed the functions of the grand jury before these enact-
ments and in a more economical and efficient manner, 4 with pro-
than one separate failure or refusal before that grand jury. In addition to his rights
granted under s.885.15 and sub. (I) any witness compelled to testify or produce
evidence before a grand jury shall have complete and unlimited immunity, except
that no personal shall be exempted from prosecution and punishment for perjury or
false swearing committed in so testifying.
83. Fahringer, Lawyer for the Witness, 9 TRIAL 12 (1973).
84. The grand jury may offer to the prosecutor two attractive procedures not available
to him in a John Doe. First, the subpoena power is greater in that a witness can be extradited
to this state to testify at a grand jury investigation from states which are parties to the
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secutorial advantage dissipated the grand jury would most likely
fall into disuse. In light of the available alternatives, this result is
a good one.
THE OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM IN WISCONSIN
The statutory provisions dealing with the grand jury are Wis-
consin Statute sections 255.10-255.26, which deal with proce-
dural rather than substantive aspects of the grand jury. The proce-
dural aspects, although important in terms of the efficient opera-
tion of the grand jury, do not insure that the grand jury will operate
in accordance with constitutional standards. For this reason, a
study of Wisconsin case law is a necessary supplement.
According to the procedure established by chapter 255 of the
Wisconsin Statutes, upon a written order of a court the jury com-
missioner selects seventeen persons to constitute the grand jury. 5
The grand jury serves for the current term of the court but may,
upon an order of the court, continue during the following term. 6
The court may discharge the grand jury at any time.87 Once
impaneled, the jury is sworn, a foreman and a clerk are selected,
and a reporter is chosen and sworn. 8 The grand jury cannot trans-
act business with less than fourteen members in attendance and no
indictment can be returned unless at least twelve of the members
concur."
Uniform Act for the Extradition of Prisoners as witnesses and the Uniform Act for the
Extradition of Witnesses in Criminal Actions. Wis. STAT. §§ 976.01, 976.02 (1973). Second,
the prosecutor may also avoid statute of limitations problems. If a suspect cannot be
located, no preliminary hearing may be held, and if the end of the statute of limitations
period for the crime is near, the suspect may escape prosecution altogether. Since a potential
defendent is not permitted to be present at grand jury proceedings, there is no deterrent to
securing an indictment against him in his absence, thereby resolving the prosecutor's prob-
lem. Boyarsky, supra note 54, at 68.
85. Wisconsin Statute section 255.10(1) provides that the grand jury commissioner,
upon written notification from any judge, shall select a jury list of not less than seventy-
five nor more than 150 persons; section 255.10(2) provides that from the jury list, thirty-six
names shall be selected pursuant to Wisconsin Statute section 255.05 to comprise the grand
jury panel; pursuant to section 255.10(3) the impaneling judge conducts the voir dire to
determine whether the members of the grand jury panel are qualified to sit on the grand
jury. The district attorney or other prosecutorial officer has the option to also examine the
grand jury panel at this time; section 255.10(4), provides the procedure for the addition of
members to the grand jury panel, for such panel must at all times consist of at least twenty
qualified members; section 255.10(5) provides for the selection of seventeen members for
the grand jury from among those in the grand jury panel.
86. See Wis. STAT. § 255.10(6) (1973).
87. Id.
88. Wis. STAT. §§ 255.11, 255.12, 255.13 (1973).
89. Wis. STAT. § 255.16 (1973).
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Other statutory provisions dealing with the procedural aspects
of the grand jury are as follows: Section 255.14 deals with the oath
to witnesses appearing before the grand jury which is administered
by either the foreman, district attorney or other prosecuting offi-
cer. Section 255.15 sets forth the requirement that the district
attorney attend all grand jury sessions when required for the pur-
poses of questioning witnesses, advising the jury on legal matters,
and issuing subpoenas and other processes to bring up the wit-
nesses. Section 255.16 requires attendance of all seventeen grand
jurors unless excused by the foreman for good and sufficient cause.
Section 255.17 permits the grand jury to return progress reports
and indictments to the court from time to time until its discharge.
Section 255.18 provides that the jury clerk shall collect all records
of the grand jury and deliver them as the grand jury directs, either
to the attorney general, the district attorney, or upon approval of
the court, to the clerk of courts. Section 255.19 provides that if the
court so orders, neither a grand juror nor an officer of the court
may disclose the names of any persons indicted until such persons
have been arrested. Section 255.20 provides that the manner in
which a grand juror votes shall not be disclosed in court. Section
255.21 permits the members of the grand jury and the grand jury
reporter to testify in court as to testimony given by a witness before
the grand jury. This section also provides that a certified transcript
of the testimony taken at the grand jury proceeding may be used
for impeachment purposes at the trial. Section 255.22 provides that
even though the grand jury has been dismissed during a court term
without having been directed to return on a certain day, the grand
jury can nevertheless be resummoned to attend a further hearing
during the same term of the court whenever the court may direct.
Section 255.23 provides for a fine of up to $40.00 for any juror who
shall fail to attend a session without sufficient excuse. Sections
255.24, 255.25, and 255.26 deal with compensation and reimburse-
ment for the grand jury members. These statutory provisions, pro-
cedural in their content, do not provide sufficient detail to fully
determine the functions and limitations within which the grand
jury must operate, and therefore a review of Wisconsin case law is
necessary.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has discussed in general terms
the qualifications of persons to sit on the grand jury and the justifi-
cation for the requirement that the impaneling judge conduct a voir
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dire of the grand jury panel. In State v. Wescott," the court stated
that the persons chosen for the grand jury panel should be those
who will represent the public; that friendship, sympathy, or preju-
dice should not be a factor in a grand juror's decision to vote for
or in opposition to an indictment; and that in order to adequately
protect the rights of a potential defendant as well as the rights of
the public, the courts must be vested with the power to determine
in advance whether prospective jurors are in fact competent and
impartial." However, strict compliance with the statutory proce-
dure for the impaneling of the grand jury is not required in order
to return a valid indictment. In Petition of Salen,92 the court held
that merely demonstrating that there had been irregularities in a
selection of the jury would not be sufficient grounds to support a
motion to quash an indictment, but rather the defendant "...
must establish the fact that such error has prejudiced him by affect-
ing his substantial rights. 93 Accordingly, in State v. Wescott 4 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that it was not prejudicial error for
the impaneling judge to appoint the foreman of the grand jury
notwithstanding a statutory provision to the contrary.
Also, in response to increasing charges of discriminatory im-
balances in the composition of the grand jury, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in United States v. Gast95 determined that
the grand jury did not have to be a statistical mirror of the com-
munity, that it need not conform to the proportionate strength of
each identifiable group in the total population, and that the use of
voter registration lists was a permissible means of selection."
In Wisconsin the grand jury is merely an inquisitorial and accu-
satorial body and does not act as a quasi-judicial body.97 The pri-
mary function of the grand jury is the determination of whether
there is probable cause to hold a person for trial. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court defined the criteria for the determination of proba-
ble cause in State v. Lawler,9" where it stated that: "probable cause
.. . is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would
90. 194 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 283 (1928).
91. Id. at 421.
92. 231 Wis. 489, 286 N.W. 5 (1939).
93. Id. at 491, quoting State v. Wescott, infra note 94.
94. 194 Wis. 410, 217 N.W. 283 (1928).
95. 457 F.2d 141.
96. Id. at 142.
97. State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 430, 267 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
98. Id.
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excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind, acting on all the facts
and circumstances within the knowledge of the magistrate, that the
charge made by the application for the warrant is true."99
The court in Lawler, concluded that equivalent information
and evidence was required in order for the grand jury to be justified
in returning the indictment. Despite this fact, the impaneling court
need not instruct the jury as to probable cause, and even if instruc-
tions are given by the court, the jury, at its option may ignore the
instructions.10 The court has held, however, that although a failure
of the court to instruct the grand jury does not invalidate the
indictment returned, if the court goes beyond the giving of instruc-
tions and expresses an opinion as to the guilt of a particular person,
the indictment may be quashed.101
- When at least twelve members of the grand jury have deter-
mined that there is probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the
person responsible has been identified, the grand jury is obligated
to return an indictment to the court charging the person with the
crime. This is known as a "true bill."10 And conversely, if there is
not a finding of probable cause by at least twelve members of the
grand jury, it returns a "no bill."''0 3
There is a presumption in Wisconsin that the indictment sup-
plies notice to the suspect so as to enable him to make a proper
plea to the indictment.104 But a certain degree of specificity is re-
quired without which the indictment maybe quashed. The indict-
ment must contain a statement of the offense in the language of
the statute which will inform the accused of the particular statute
allegedly violated. 05 The degree of particularity required has not
been adequately defined. Earlier cases required that all the facts
and circumstances which constituted the offense be stated in the
indictment. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that the defen-
dant should be able to judge whether the facts alleged constituted
an indictable offense in order that he adequately prepare his de-
99. Id. at 434, citing State v. Baltes, 183 Wis. 545, 198 N.W. 282 (1924).
100. Id. at 427.
101. Id. at 428.
102. WRIGHT, I FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 197 (1969).
103. Id.
104. See Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1943); and Havenor
v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 104 N.W. 116 (1905).
105. Liscowitz v. State, 229 Wis. 636, 641, 282 N.W. 103 (1939).
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fense.'10 The degree of particularity required was subsequently
relaxed in later cases and indictments today merely quote the stat-
ute allegedly violated. °7 The reason for the lack of specificity
would appear to be prosecutorial fear of disclosing relevant facts
which the grand jury has discovered in the course of its investiga-
tion. Despite the relaxation of the rule that the indictment should
contain all facts and circumstances which constitute the offense
alleged, if the language is sufficiently ambiguous so that no offense
is charged, the indictment will be quashed.' °
Prior to the recently enacted statute providing for a preliminary
hearing whenever one is charged with a felony in an indictment
once the grand jury had returned the indictment, the accused had
very little chance of getting the indictment reviewed by a magis-
trate prior to trial. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held that,
in accordance with the great weight of authority, the sufficiency of
the evidence for the grand jury to warrant it in returning an indict-
ment was not reviewable upon a plain abatement or a motion to
quash the indictment.' ° The presumption of the validity of the
106. Fink v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 27, 29 (1863); accord, Alan v. State, 5 Wis.
329, 335 (1856).
107. State v. Kitzerow, 221 Wis. 436, 439, 267 N.W. 71, 72 (1936).
108. Id.
109. State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
• Although the cases have not always noticed it, the policy of secrecy is as a
practical matter involved when the defendant seeks to find out what transpired in
the grand jury room so that he can attack the competency or sufficiency of the
evidence or misconduct in the grand jury room. Three devices have been used to
attack the competency or sufficiency of the evidence, sometimes all in the same case:
(1) motion to inspect the minutes, (2) plea in abatement, and (3) motion to quash.
In practice it has proved very difficult if not impossible for the defendant to obtain
evidence to support his plea in abatement or motion to quash ....
Numerous procedural roadblocks make it virtually impossible for the defendant
to attack the evidence before the grand jury. Many examples follow. When the record
shows that the grand jury found the indictment on their oaths, there is a presumption
that it was found on legal evidence, with due deliberation, and by the concurrence
of twelve of their number. A court will not inquire into the sufficiency of the evidence
if the proceedings of the grand jury are regular on their face. It has been held that a
motion to quash lies only for defects appearing on the face of the record.
The burden is on the defendant to establish his contention that no evidence or
insufficient evidence was presented to the grand jury. An averment on information
and belief will not support a plea in abatement on the ground that the grand jury
did not know the contents of the indictment. A defendant's affidavit on information
and belief that there was no competent evidence will not support a motion to quash.
A defendant's offer to prove by an assistant United States Attorney that there was
no competent evidence was held to be a mere conclusion not supporting a plea in
abatement.
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indictment adversely affected the person accused in that he could
not ordinarily challenge the indictment and could not therefore
obtain any information concerning the investigatorial process that
had occurred. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex rel. Welsh
v. Waukesha County Circuit Court,"' stated that:
The sufficiency of the indictment, its alleged weaknesses or pro-
cedural defects upon which it might be founded were hard to
discover because of the secrecy surrounding the grand jury, and
for the most practical purposes such errors could not be effec-
tively raised prior to trial. It was presumed the indictment was
founded upon a sufficient legal basis although neither the com-
mon law nor our statutes required or now requires the judge
conducting the grand jury proceeding to instruct the jury upon
the quality or quantity of proof necessary to support the indict-
ment."'
A motion to quash on the ground that the grand jury received certain incompeteit
evidence is insufficient, fails where it is not alleged nor shown that there was not other
and competent evidence on the subject on which the indictment was based.
A plea in abatement that the defendant's private books and papers were wrong-
fully produced before the grand jury in violation of the privilege of self incrimination
where it fails to show that there was no other competent evidence upon which the
indictment was found. The same is true when the privilege against illegal searches
and seizures is involved. It should be noted that these caeses do not say that if the
only evidence before the grand jury was obtained in violation of constitutional rights
the result would be the same. An indictment based on merely incompetent evidence
does not violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Holmes doubted how far, if at all,
a court is warranted in inquiring into the nature of the evidence on which a grand
jury has acted, and whether the discretion of the trial court is subject to review.
Indictments should not be upset because some evidence, in its nature competent, but
ruled incompetent by circumstances, was considered along with other evidence. A
witness had testified as to admissions by the accused obtained under circumstances
making them incompetent.
When a defendant has pleaded not guilty and a jury has been impaneled, the court
will not interrupt the trial to determine whether there was sufficient evidence before
the grand jury. A motion in arrest of judgment will not usually lie to attack the
sufficiency of the evidence before the grand jury as it is necessary to contradict the
record, and the showing must therefore be clear and convincing. Many cases have
held that the denial of a motion to quash an indictment founded on incompetent
evidence is a matter of discretion not to be reviewed on appeal. Objections that
competent testimony was not presented to the grand jury cannot be raised by habeas
corpus. This is true though the evidence may have been obtained by illegal search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Orfield, supra note 9 at 404 to 409.
110. 52 Wis. 2d 221, 189 N.W.2d 417 (1971).
11!. Id. at 224.
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The presumption of the validity of the indictment is rebuttable.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that if it appears that there
was no evidence before the grand jury upon which the indictment
could have been based, it may be quashed." 2 However, procuring
the evidence in support of a challenge is often difficult. Wisconsin
Statute section 255-21 contains a provision dealing with impeach-
ment under which grand jury testimony may be disclosed. In addi-
tion, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has stated that there may be
times when in the interest of justice the grand jury record may be
looked into,"' but the accused has no right to inspect the minutes
in order to make a proper defense,"4 and the fact that the law
permits the testimony to be available for use by the prosecutor does
not mean that that same privilege is extended to defense counsel." 5
Consequently, there is very little chance for discovery of any aspect
of the grand jury proceeding.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated its opposition to
any discovery of the grand jury proceeding in Steensland v.
Hoppmann,"' in which the court stated:
And there exists the very practical reasons, especially applicable
to the situation where the jury is continuing to sit, that the inspec-
tion of the minutes if permitted to any defendant for the purpose
of preparing his defense would advise the public of a subject
under investigation, afford the opportunity to those interested in
thwarting an inquiry in to their acts of secreting evidence, tamp-
ering with prospective testimony, and generally embarrassing the
work to be done by the grand jury, if not entirely defeating the
object for which the body is designed. "7
The language of the Wisconsin Supreme Court is not very
persuasive in the light of a recent United States Supreme Court
decision in which that court identified what it considered to be a
"growing realization that disclosure, rather than suppression of
relevant materials ordinarily promotes the proper admininstration
of criminal justice.""' The court also noted that there is an expand-
ing body of material, "judicial and otherwise" favoring disclosure
112. State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 267 N.W.2d 65 (1963).
113. Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 595, 252 N.W. 146, 147 (1934).
114. Havenor v. State, 125 Wis. 444, 450, 104 N.W. 116, 118 (1905).
115. State v. Krause, 260 Wis. 313, 329, 50 N.W.2d 439, 447 (1951).
116. Steensland v. Hoppmann, 213 Wis. 593, 252 N.W. 146 (1934).
117. Id. at 598.
118. Dennis v. State, 384 U.S. 855, 870 (1966).
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in criminal cases analogous to that in civil practice.1 In that same
case, 2 1 the court also stated that the trial judge could not be as-
sumed to be able to go through the grand jury transcript to decide
if there is any evidence that the defense should have to impeach
witnesses because of the voluminous materials and because,
in our adversary system, it is enough for judges to judge. The
determination of what may be useful to the defense can properly
and effectively be made only by the advocate."'
Nevertheless, the dilemma often facing defense counsel is how to
overcome the presumption of the validity of the indictment in those
instances in which the record itself provides the best source of
proof, and the record is closed to inspection. In Wisconsin, the use
of three statutory provisions may supply at least a basis for argu-
ment. Under section 971.31(5)(b) in any felony actions, motions to
suppress evidence or motions under sections 971.23 to 971.25 may
not be made at a preliminary examination but may be made as
soon as the information has been filed.12 Under section 971.23,
upon demand the district attorney must supply to the defendant
within a reasonable time before trial the names of witnesses to the
written and oral statements of the defendant which the state plans
to use in the course of trial.Iu Under section 971.24, the defendant
may procure the production of any statement made by a witness
either written or phonographically recorded for cause. 24 Thus, by
procuring a list of the witnesses to be called by the district attorney
119. Id. at 871.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 875.
122. WIs. STAT. § 971.31(5)(b) (1971): In felony actions, motions to suppress evidence
or motions under § 971.23 to 971.25 or objections to the admissibility of statements of a
defendant shall not be made at a preliminary examination and not until an information has
been filed.
123. Wis. STAT. § 971.23(1) (1973): (1) DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS. Upon demand, the
district attorney shall permit the defendant within a reasonable time before trial to inspect
and copy or photograph any written or recorded statement concerning the alleged crime
made by the defendant which is wthin the possession, custody or control of the state
including the testimony of the defendant in an s. 968.26 proceeding or before a grand jury.
Upon demand, the district attorney shall furnish the defendant with a written summary of
all oral statements of the defendant which he plans to use in course of the trial. The names
of witnesses to the written and oral statements which the state plans to use in the course of
the trial shall also be furnished. (Emphasis added.)
124. Wis. STAT. § 971.24 (1973). Statement of witnesses. (1) At the trial, before a
witness other than the defendant testifies, written or photographically recorded statements
of the witness, if any, shall be given to the other party in the absence of the jury. For cause,
the court may order the production of such statement prior to trial. (Emphasis added.)
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under section 971.23, a prosecutor could interview them concern-
ing anything they may have said before the grand jury concerning
the defendant. A witness before the grand jury not being required
to remain silent may divulge any information he desires. If any
basis for challenge presents itself in the interview, a pretrial motion
to produce the statements of the witness or witnesses may be made
under 971.24. Thus, while the evidence would not be available at
the preliminary, it would still be available before trial.
There are two obstacles to overcome in attempting to apply
these statutes. First, there is quite obviously no mandate within the
construction of this statutory approach requiring a judge presented
with evidence based on witness interviews to apply the "interests
of justice" test and penetrate the secrecy of the grand jury minutes.
Second, the court in Hoppmann, supra, in discussing cases from
other jurisdictions advanced by the defendant in attempting to
convince the court to permit inspection of the minutes, rejected as
being persuasive a New York case, People v. Milineux.1m A deci-
sive factor in Milineux, upon which the court permitted the inspec-
tion of the grand jury minutes, was the fact that the defendant had
been deprived of a preliminary examination."'6 In light of the fact
that the Wisconsin court refused inspection of the record when no
right to a preliminary examination existed, the fact that a defen-
dant now has a right to such a procedure makes discovery even less
probable.
Some relatively recent developments, namely, the allowance of
collateral attacks on an indictment, may have extensive impact on
the grand jury. In United States v. Kreps,11z the defendant had,
prior to his appearance before the grand jury, been advised of his
constitutional rights by members of the FBI and had signed a
waiver of those rights. When he appeared before the grand jury,
he was accompanied by counsel and had been advised by counsel
regarding his appearnace before the grand jury. But, he was at no
time either prior to nor during the course of his testimony before
the grand jury told that he was a subject of the investigation nor
was he advised of his constitutional rights nor requested to sign a
waiver of those rights. The court, while noting that the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals had held it permissible to compel even a
125. 27 Misc. 60, 57 N.W. Supp. 936 (1899) as discussed in Hoppmann, 595-596.
126. Id. at 62.
127. 349 F.Supp. 1049 (D.C. Wis. 1972).
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"probable defendant" to appear before the grand jury and
testify, 128 held that ". . . one as to whom criminal proceedings
have become accusatory is entitled to some measure of protection
of his privilege against self-incrimination when he appears before
the grand jury."'29
Counsel for the government in Kreps contended that the oppor-
tunity to consult an attorney prior to one's appearance before the
grand jury and to have a lawyer available outside the grand jury
room for consultation during the questioning was sufficient protec-
tion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The court found
this contention, although not unreasonable, unacceptable. Accord-
ingly, the indictment was dismissed for failure to give the Miranda
warnings.'30
A similar problem related to the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination was set forth in State v. Ruggeri' in which the
court held that the target of the grand jury investigation must be
informed that he is the subject of the investigation prior to his
testimony before the grand jury.32 The attorney general of the
State of Wisconsin has recommended that the rules adopted in
Ruggeri be followed in Wisconsin. 33 The Utah Supreme Court
held that the target of the investigation is an accused within the
meaning of the constitution, and when detained in any significant
way, including appearances before the grand jury, he may not be
interrogated unless advised of the charges against him then under
consideration. The court held that the failure to warn the defendant
that he was the subject of the investigation amounted to entrap-
ment and violated his constitutional privilege against self-
incrimination. 34 The court went on to hold that when a possible
defendant or target is subpoenaed before a grand jury, whether he
claims or asserts his privilege against self-incrimination or not, his
constitutional privilege is being violated.
An automatic result of the violation of this constitutional privi-
lege is that the defendant is protected not only from the indict-
128. United States v. Cesalu, 338 F.2d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 1964).
129. United States v. Kreps, 349 F. Supp. 1049, 1052 (D.C. Wis. 1972).
130. Id.
131. 19 Utah 2d 216, 429 P.2d 969 (1967).
132. Id. at 225.
133. See BROWN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATTORNEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE 9
(1971).
134. State v. Rugged, 19 Utah 2d 216, 223, 429 P.2d 969 (1967).
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ment based on any incriminating testimony which he may have
given, but also from the use of such evidence."'
The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled that a
grand jury witness has standing to object to a qu'estion derived
from illegal electronic surveillance of a telephone conversation thus
opening another possible avenue for a collateral attack on the
grand jury indictment. In Gelbard v. United States,136 the Su-
preme Court did not go beyond the standing question to discuss
the merits, but Mr. Justice Douglas in a concurring opinion3'
stated that the Fourth Amendment shields a grand jury witness
from any question (or a subpoena) which is based upon informa-
tion derived from searches which invaded the constitutionally pro-
tected right of privacy. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals sitting
en bancel' reached the merits of the issue involved in Gelbard and
held that a witness subpoenaed before the grand jury could not be
examined by way of questions based on information obtained
through illegal and unconstitutional wiretapping.
Although there would seem to be a logical nexus between
Gelbard and those principles and statements formally announced
by the Wisconsin Supreme Court that an indictment may be
quashed if "the sole evidence" upon which it (the grand jury) acted
was illegal,"1"9 the United States Supreme Court threw a wrench
into the works in United States v. Calandra." ' In Calandra, the
Court refused to extend the exclusionary rule of search and seizure
to grand jury proceedings. The basis of the challenge rested on the
fact that evidence used to bring the defendant before the grand jury
was seized in a search which exceeded the scope of the warrant.
The majority rejected the application of the Fourth Amendment
right finding that the rule's prime purpose of deterring future un-
lawful police conduct was effectuated by the fact that such evidence
would be inadmissible at trial,"' and that "the probable result
would be 'protracted interruption of grand jury proceedings.'
Gelbard v. United States . .. effectively transforming them
135. Id.
136. 408 U.S. 41, (1972).
137. Id. at 62.
138. In re Grand Jury Proceeding, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 450 F.2d 199 (3rd Cir.
1971), cert. granted, 92 S. Ct. 531 (1971).
139. State v. Lawler, 221 Wis. 423, 428, 267 N.W 65 (1936).
140. - U.S -, 94 S.Ct. 613 (1974).
141. Id. at 619-20.
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[grand jury proceedings] into preliminary trials on the merits."'' 2
The Gelbard case is distinguished in a footnote of the majority
opinion.
The dissent's reliance on Gelbard v. United States . . .is mis-
placed. There, the Court construed 18 U.S.C. s. 2512, the eviden-
tiary prohibition of Tit. III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211 as amended, 18 U..S.C.
s.s. 2510-2520. It held that s. 2515 could be invoked by a grand
jury witness as a defense to a contempt charge brought for refusal
to answer questions based on information obtained from the
witness' communications alleged to have been unlawfully inter-
cepted through wiretapping and electronic surveillance. The
Court's holding rested exclusively on an interpretation of s.2515
and Tit. III, which represented a congressional effort to afford
special safeguards against the unique problems posed by misuse
of wiretapping and electronic surveillance. There was no indica-
tion in either Gelbard or the legislative history of Tit. III, that
s. 2515 was regarded as a restatement of existing law. As Mr
Justice White noted in his concurring opinion in Gelbard, s. 2515
'unquestionably works a change in the law with respect to the
rights of grand jury witness . . .' 408 U.S. 69, 70, 92 S.Ct.
2372.111
Thus, it appears that Calandra has stifled any expansion of
Fourth Amendment challenges not provided for expressly by Con-
gressional act by reaffirming a principle stated within the very
language of the Gelbard case itself. As the Court had stated, rely-
ing on Blue v. United States,'44 it had no intention of retreating
from the general rule that ". . . a defendant is not entitled to have
his indictment dismissed simply because the Government
acquire[d] incriminating evidence in violation of the [law]' even if
the tainted evidence was presented to the grand jury.""'
In United States v. Estepa,48 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed a federal heroin conviction and ordered that the
indictment underlying that conviction be dismissed. The indict-
ment had been obtained almost entirely on the basis of hearsay
testimony, but the members of the grand jury had not been in-
formed that the information was hearsay and therefore were left
142. Id. at 621.
143. Id. at 623.
144. 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
145. Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41, 60 (1972).
146. 471 F.2d 1132 (2d Cir. 1972).
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with the impression that it was direct testimony. Although not
setting forth any standard for the admission of hearsay evidence
before a grand jury, the court in Estepa made it very clear that the
grand jury must not be misled to thinking it is getting eye-witness
testimony when, in fact, it is being given an account whose hearsay
nature is concealed. At least within the Second Circuit, it would
appear that a grand jury must be specifically informed that the
nature of the evidence they are hearing is hearsay in order that the
grand jury might judge the weight and credibility of such testi-
mony.
Under the federal grand jury system, each witness has the right
to confer with counsel after each question. 4' As a practical matter
the same right is extended to witnesses before any Wisconsin grand
jury. Indeed, it is doubtful whether a witness can be denied an
opportunity to confer with counsel whenever he desires.4 ' A wit-
ness appearing before the grand jury has the right to invoke the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. This privi-
lege was made applicable to the states through the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' By invoking this privilege,
a witness can thereby refuse to answer certain questions directed
to him. It has been held that this privilege does not extend to
criminal acts, the prosecution for which is barred by the statute of
limitations.' A witness at a grand jury proceeding may be in a
dilemma concerning the timing of the assertion of his constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination. Due to the fiction of
secrecy surrounding the grand jury and the accompanying exclu-
sion of the witness' lawyer from the grand jury room, a witness
may assert his constitutional privilege prematurely thereby subject-
ing himself to contempt of court, and conversely, he may hestitate
in the assertion too long and thereby waive the privilege altogether.
The predicament in which a witness finds himself was articulated
by Justice Black's dissent in Rogers v. United States:5'
• . . [T]oday's holding creates this dilemma for witnesses: On the
one hand, they risk imprisonment for contempt by asserting the
147. United States v. Leighton, 265 F. Supp. 27, 37 (1967).
148. United States v. Uitich, an unpublished case from the Western District of Wiscon-
sin, decided on February 24, 1970.
149. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
150. State ex rel. Rizzo v. County Court, 32 Wis. 2d 642, 146 N.W.2d 499, cert denied,
386 U.S. 1035 (1966).
151. 340 U.S. 367 (1950).
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privilege prematurely; on the other hand, they might lose the
privilege if they answer a single question. The Court's view
makes the protection depend on timing so refined that lawyers,
let alone laymen, will have difficulty in knowing when to claim
it. In this very case, it never- occurred to the trial judge that
petitioner waived anything."'
Waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination may occur
inadvertently, for the privilege must be claimed to be effective. The
original rule in Wisconsin' was that the statute which granted
immunity posed no condition on its application, and therefore per-
sons were granted complete immunity from later prosecution aris-
ing out of the transactions or facts testified to. This decision was
subsequently overruled,' and now the rule is that the statutory
immunity created is coexistent with the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination, and therefore a claim of privilege is a
condition precedent to receiving immunity.' Hence, if a witness
answers incriminating questions without first claiming his privilege
against self-incrimination, no immunity is conferred. If a witness
claims the privilege against self-incrimination to questions put to
him by the grand jury, he can be compelled to answer them only
"by order of the court on motion of the district attorney.' '1 56
In State ex rel Rizzo v. County Court,'57 the court noted that
a witness before a grand jury will be immune to prosecution as to
the offense about which he testifies only if:
1. He was actually compelled to testify under the statute;
2. The testimony that he divulged while under compulsion was
part of or led to the evidence which supports the prosecution
from which he claims immunity;
3. He must have been compelled to testify "by order of the
court on motion of the district attorney.""'
This last requirement has been interpreted as meaning that the
order must be issued from an open court sitting as such, and that
152. Id. at 378.
153. See Murphy v. State, 128 Wis. 201, 107 N.W. 470 (1906).
154. See Carchidi v. State, 187 Wis. 438, 204 N.W. 473 (1925); State v. Grosnickle,
189 Wis. 17, 206 N.W. 865 (1926); Ciolocomic v. State, 198 Wis. 18,222 N.W. 825 (1929).
155. State ex rel: Rizzo v. County Court, 32 Wis. 2d 642, 646, 146 N.W.2d 499 (1966).
156. See Wis. STAT. § 972.08(1) (1973).
157. 32 Wis. 2d 642, 146 N.W.2d 499 (1966).
158. Id. at 646.
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the order of a magistrate is insufficient.' The Wisconsin Supreme
Court on at least one occasion has allowed partial disclosure of the
grand jury minutes to allow the defendant at trial the opportunity
to establish his defense of immunity.'
The problem of waiver of the right against self-incrimination,
as stated before, is accentuated by the inability of the witness to
have his attorney present during the questioning. The problem can
be somewhat relieved if the witness consults with his attorney after
each question. A witness who testifies to a matter before a grand
jury does not thereby waive his right to claim the constitutional
privilege against self-incrimination as to the subject matter when
called as a witness in the subsequent trial of one indicted by that
grand jury.'6' When one indicted is brought to trial, a member of
the grand jury or its reporter can be brought before the trial court
to testify as to the consistency of statements made by the witness
at trial as compared with his testimony before the grand jury. 62
The immunity that is granted pursuant to Wisconsin statute
section 972.08(1) is the so-called transactional immunity as op-
posed to the "use" immunity granted by federal judges, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 6002. The constitutionality of use immunity was
recently upheld in Kastigar v. United States.'63 Once immunity
has been granted and a witness is compelled to testify "by order
of the court on motion of the district attorney," refusal of the
witness to testify may result in civil or criminal contempt and the
court has the power to confine the unwilling witness "until such
time as the witness is willing to give such testimony or until such
trial, grand jury term or John Doe investigation is concluded but
in no case exceeding one year."' 64 The potential for abuse abounds
in this procedure also, for although the maximum jail sentence for
refusing to testify is theoretically set, there is nothing to stop suc-
cessive grand juries from subpoenaing a single witness again and
again in an attempt to force the witness to testify.'65
A witness before a state grand jury may not be compelled to
159. See State ex rel. Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963).
160. See Murphy v. State, 124 Wis. 635, 102 N.W. 1087 (1905).
161. See e.g., In re Neff, 206 F.2d 149 (3rd Cir. 1953).
162. See vis. STAT. § 255.21 (1973).
163. 406 U.S. 441 (1972).
164. See Vis. STAT. § 972.08(2) (1973).
165. For an account of such abusive practices on the federal level see Donner & Cerruti,
The Grand Jury Network, How the Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted the
Traditional Safeguard of Individual Rights, THE NATION (Jan. 3, 1972) at 5-20.
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give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law un-
less the compelling testimony cannot be used in any manner by
federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against
the one so compelled.' The Wisconsin Supreme Court had pre-
viously held' that the state could compel testin:mony notwith-
standing that a federal prosecution was imminent and that the
individual would be incriminating himself to federal charges.
Lastly, despite the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Branzburg v. Hayes," the First Amendment may supply a witness
166. Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
167. See State ex rel Jackson v. Coffey, 18 Wis. 2d 529, 118 N.W.2d 939 (1963).
168. 408 U.S. 665 (1971). The issue before the Court concerned the obligation of
reporters to respond to grand jury subpoenas as other citizens do and to answer questions
relevant to an investigation into the commission of crime. The decision embraced three
lower court decisions: United States v. Caldwell, 434 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1970), Branzburg
v. Pound, 461 S.W.2d 345 (Ky. 1971) and In re Pappas, 358 Mass. 604, 266 N.E.2d 297
(1971). The majority court in the 5-4 decision held that reporters, just as citizens, are not
constitutionally immune from grand jury subpoenas and neither the First Amendment nor
any other constitutional provision protects a reporter from disclosing to a grand jury infor-
mation that he has received in confidence based on the assertion that the flow of news from
informants would be stifled and news gathering thereby curtailed. [p. 682]. As the court
noted:
[A]t the federal level, Congress has freedom to determine whether a statutory news-
man's privilege is necessary and desirable and to fashion standards and rules as
narrow or broad as deemed necessary to deal with the evil discerned and, equally
important, to refashion those rules as experience from time to time may dictate.
There is also merit in leaving state legislatures free, within First Amendment limits,
to fashion their own standards in light of the conditions and problems with respect
to the relations between law enforcement officials and press in their own areas. It
goes without saying, of course, that we are powerless to bar state courts from
responding in their vwn way and construing their own constitutions so as to recognize
a newsman's privilege, either qualified or absolute.
Id. at 706. See in this regard State v. Knops, 49 Wis. 2d 647, 183 N.W.2d 93 (1971)
(dictum).
Justice Powell, responding to the dissenting justices' concern that First Amendment
rights had been dealt a serious blow emphasized the scope of the majority's opinion:
If a newsman believes that the grand jury investigation is not being conducted in good
faith he is not without remedy. Indeed, if the newsman is called upon to give informa-
tion bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investiga-
tion, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confiden-
tial source relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement, he will have
access to the Court on a motion to quash and an appropriate protective order may
be entered. The asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts by the
striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the obligation of all
citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal conduct. The balance of
these vital constitutional and societal- interest on a case-by-case basis accords with
the tried and traditional way adjudicating such questions.
Id. at 710.
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before the grand jury a measure of protection. Although a predict-
able and generally applicable test has not been specified,"6 9 the
balancing test as developed in cases checking governmental abuse
of power in legislative investigations is still applicable.17 There are
a number of procedural devices available to an attorney whose
client may suffer an unwarranted intrusion into a valid first amend-
ment interest, among them being a motion to quash a subpoena,'
169. Weisman & Postal, The First Amendment As A Restraint On The Grand Jury
Process, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 689 (1971-1972).
170. Id. at 689.
The balancing test had developed to require that before the state would be allowed
to enforce compliance with its investigative demands which encroached on funda-
mental freedoms protected by the first amendment, it must show: (a) a subordinating
state interest which is compelling; (b) a reasonable nexus or relationship between that
interest and the defined subject under investigation; and (c) a reasonable means for
pursuing the objective.
Id. at 687-688.
171. If a witness has been subpoenaed before a grand jury investigating an un-
specified subject matter, the subpoena should be challenged on a motion to quash.
Indefiniteness in the scope of governmental inquiry has consistently been regarded
as fatal to investigations in the first amendment area. The requirement of strict
definition of the scope and purpose of the investigation provides the necessary safe-
guard against overbroad and formless investigations which-like overbroad and
formless laws-"lend themselves too readily to the denial of (first amendment)...
rights." Where it appears that the grand jury investigation is pursuing a subject
matter outside the scope of its legitimate function, or an area unrelated to the defined
inquiry, prior judicial relief should be available.
If a witness had been subpoenaed before a grand jury investigating a defined
subject, a motion to quash should lie where a demonstrated threat or injury to first
amendment rights can be shown. The court will probably require a specific proffer
before entertaining the motion. Such a requirement may be difficult to fulfill unless
tangible evidence can be produced to support the assertion of a first amendment
interest. . . .The state ought to be required to convincingly demonstrate a substan-
tial relationship between the information sought and a subject of overriding and
compelling state interest. The state must be prepared to establish a factual basis for
the need to compel the particular witness' attendance or testimony, and must further
provide a sufficient nexs between the individual whose first amendment rights are
threatened by the state action and the particular activity under investigation. An
investigation into alleged criminal activity of persons readily identified with dissident
groups cannot provide a carte blanche for the investigation of all persons directly or
indirectly connected with that political faction. The Supreme Court has held that
courts cannot simply assume that every congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that overbalances any private right asserted. A grand jury investigation
should be subject to no lesser standard. . . .Where a witness applies for preliminary
relief from compulsory process, the government will likely argue that any required
showing on its part will seriously hamper the recognized need for flexibility in grand
jury proceedings, result in the premature forced disclosure of the government's case,
and substantially alter the widely accepted need for secrecy in the grand jury proceed-
ings. These arguments have not prevented judicial intervention to safeguard other
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a protective order prohibiting inquiry into areas of protected free-
doms,172 an appeal, 73 and refusal to answer qustions asked by the
grand jury based on the First Amendment. 7 1
constitutional and nonconstitutional rights of witnesses to resist compulsory process.
Id. at 690-694.
172. Where it appears that the court will be reluctant to quash the subpoena, the
witness may seek a protective order prohibiting inquiry into areas of protected
freedoms. A protective order could, in certain cases, obviate the case-by-case,
question-by-question, judicial resolution of a proper balance. While such an ap-
proach does not fully protect against all resulting "chilling effects" on protected
freedoms, several courts have attempted this limited safeguard where the first
amendment's interest could not be ignored or subjugated to the state's need for the
witness' attendance or testimony.
Id. at 692-693.
173. Where a valid first amendment interest is shown and the federal court
refuses to either grant a motion to quash or issue a protective order, an emergency
appeal should be considered. Ordinarily, no appeal lies from a motion to quash.
Appellate resolution is generally available only after the witness has been held in
contempt. However, appellate intervention should be sought by invoking the court's
equitable jurisdiction to check a substantial and irreparable harm to first amendment
interest without forcing the witness to first experience the penal stigma of a contempt
judgment.
Id. at 693.
174. Where the court declines to preliminarily resolve the witness' first amend-
ment claim or grant a protective order, and all other constitutional and nonconstitu-
tional grounds for quashing the subpoena have been exhausted, the witness' atten-
dance before the grand jury will be directed. When the questioning process begins,
the witness, prior to rendering any answers, should insist on having the opportunity
to consult with his counsel. At this point in the proceedings, an examination of the
questions may reveal that the government is pursuing a line of questioning which
encroaches on the rights of the witness. If it appears that the witness is being interro-
gated on topics within the ambit of the first amendment, the witness, and his counsel,
will have to decide which means of resistance will be most successful. If the witness
makes a determination that resistance should be based solely on first amendment
grounds, a statement should be made to the grand jury that the questions will not
be answered on the grounds that the questions posed are violative of his first amend-
ment rights and that the witness reserves the right to his other constitutional and
nonconstitutional privileges and immunities. At the hearing precipitated by the gov-
ernment's application for a judicial order to compel testimony, the arguments raised
on an initial motion to quash may be far more persuasive. Armed with the specific
questions propounded by the grand jury, which now serve as a substantial basis to
establish an encroachment on activity protected under the first amendment, the
witness, through counsel, must urge the court to compel the government to make a
showing justifying compliance. At this stage, the test developed above may become
a potent means for shielding the witness from unwarranted inquiries. If the questions
reveal a general investigation into the area of first amendment activity, the govern-
ment may well be unable to show an overriding and compelling state interest which
subordinates the witness' first amendment rights. Moreover, the nexus requirement
of a substantial relationship between the subject matter under inquiry and the partic-
ular testimonylof the witness may serve to defeat the government's desire to interro-
gate this witness if such a nexus proves to be lacking. Finally, the questions them-
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CONCLUSION
Whether the grand jury in Wisconsin, in light of the changes
in the rights of individuals indicted thereby, remains a viable alter-
native for the prosecutor appears questionable. Nonetheless, as
long as the federal courts are constitutionally mandated to use the
indictment power of the grand jury to initiate the mechanisms of
the criminal justice system, lawyers in Wisconsin will continue to
find it necessary to cope with the institution. As due process and
accompanying constitutional safeguards continue to develop, so
must their application to grand jury procedure. While the argu-
ments in opposition to the grand jury procedure have been ad-
vanced for over a hundred years, the growing awareness of individ-
ual rights provides a new receptiveness to their application. To
insure that a client's rights are preserved, the Wisconsin attorney
must continue to press for an intrusion of constitutional safeguards
into the secret institution of the grand jury.
selves may refute a government claim that no alternative means of obtaining the
information is available.
Alternatively, the witness may resist the grand jury's inquiries into areas pro-
tected by the first amendment by refusing to answer on the grounds that the specific
questions constitute a violation of his rights under both the first and fifth amend-
ments. Emphasis should be put on the historical interdependence between the first
and fifth amendments to safeguard the political activities and beliefs of citizens
whose dissident political stance has rendered them the object of repressive reprisals
by those holding the political power.
The Supreme Court has recognized the close relationship between the first and
fifth amendments. But the first amendment has not been established as an indepen-
dent privilege in resisting compulsory process. Instead, courts have found the fifth
amendment adequate to protect whatever first amendment claims are raised.
In cases where the government wishes to pursue a grand jury inquiry after the
fifth amendment privilege has been raised, an application for immunity is generally
filed. Whichever immunity is invoked, the witness should resist the grant of immunity
on first amendment grounds. Even where immunity would totally insulate a witness
from future criminal prosecution, such immunity provides no safeguard against
encroachment on first amendment rights. Thus, paradoxically, the government relies
on the proscription of the fifth amendment to circumvent and defeat the mandate of
the first amendment. Recently, the government's contention that immunity grants
provide all the protection necessary has been rejected, the courts holding that a
witness, immunity notwithstanding, retains the right to challenge the use of illegally
obtained evidence and the impermissible application of the immunity statute. ...
An adverse resolution at any stage, even subsequent to a grant of immunity, should
not preclude reapplication for judicial relief where, upon further questioning, it
becomes clear that the government is now probing areas protected by the amend-
ment. Resort to such reapplication is probably necessary where the court has refused
to entertain an initial challenge to the subpoena as premature or where the earlier
questions resisted on fifth amendment grounds do not reveal a discernible encroach-
ment.
Id. at 693-696.
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